I . I N T R OD U C T I ON
Telecommunications tra c is an important production input for information intensive sectors, and its economically e cient delivery provides a basis for competitive advantage. Between 1986 and 1995 world international message telephone services (IMTS) tra c increased by 12.9 per cent per annum, with total retail revenues of 53 billion United States Dollars (US$) in 1995 (International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 1997a) . Such services are traditionally jointly provided by publicly-owned monopolies who connect their local networks to designated international gateways. Bilateral market cost sharing agreements between countries are arranged through the international accounting rate system. The accounting rate is the basic`unit of account' from which international settlement payments are calculated. A carrier' s accounting rate share, the settlement rate, determines the amount the carrier must pay to access another country's network. When settlement rates are equal for outgoing and incoming calls, and outgoing is greater (less) than incoming tra c, the home country is a net importer (exporter) of telephone tra c and makes (receives) a settlement payment to (from) the foreign country. In 1995, the amount paid by carriers to settle IMTS tra c imbalances was USD28 billion (ITU, 1997a) .
In the immediate post-war period the accounting rate system provided a reasonable basis for international telecommunications pricing and carrier settlements. Bilateral tra c¯ows were generally balanced and retail prices (collection rates) uniform. This stable environment began to change in the 1980s with the erosion of natural monopoly through rapid technological change, and the realization that competition and private ownership are more likely to increase e ciency and provide lower prices (Oum and Zhang, 1995; Snow, 1995; Madden and Savage, 1997; Spiller and Cardilli, 1997; Waverman and Sirel, 1997) . The 1984 AT&T divestiture and privatization of British Telecom led the movement away from the traditional model of monopoly supply by stated-owned carriers. By 1996, 13 countries had permitted facilities-based competition in the provision of IMTS, and 44 publicly owned carriers had been privatized, raising US$159 billion (ITU, 1997a) . 1 Whilst technological advance has reduced the costs of providing international services, the full extent of the cost reductions are generally not re¯ected in lower collection rates. Ergas and Patterson (1991) , Alleman and Sorce (1998) and Frieden (1997) argued that the accounting rate system, and asymmetric market structures on bilateral markets, impose little discipline on monopoly carriers to pass on cost reductions.
2 Accordingly, collection rates have diverged between low price countries that pursue liberalization policies, and those which have not. Collection rate reductions by low price countries such as the United States (US) have increased their outgoing tra c relative to incoming tra c, and provided high price countries with increased settlement payments. This has occurred as users in low price countries respond to declining collection rates, and indirectly, as a result of substitution between the higher price incoming tra c and lower price outgoing tra c (Larson et al., 1990; Ergas and Patterson, 1991; Sandback, 1996) . Increased outgoing tra c not only worsens the de® cit nation's trade balance through increased settlement payments but potentially transfer rents to monopoly countries. These rents are the di erence between the settlement rate (the originating carrier's payment to access the foreign country's local exchange network) and the actual cost incurred by the foreign carrier in terminating the call. Nations with liberalized telecommunications markets that have experienced de® cits in 1995 are Australia, Japan, Sweden and the US. The largest de® cit has occurred in the US. Between 1982 and 1995, settlement payments from US to foreign carriers increased 16 per cent per annum. The 1995 net settlement payment of US$4.94 billion accounted for 4.75% of the total US trade de® cit in goods and services (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1996 ; Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 1997a) . Both the FCC (1996 and World Trade Organisation (WTO, 1997) have called for the opening of telecommunications markets to private and foreign investors, and increased competition in the delivery of local, long-distance and international services. Such policies are intended to promote price competition and productive eciency. Collection and settlement rates that better re¯ect service provision costs reduce the rents within international telecommunications pricing and so alleviate distortions in tra c¯ows (and settlement payments) .
Several studies argue that competition and collection rate di erentials alone do not explain tra c imbalances. First, Cheong and Mullins (1991) showed that collection rate di erentials were not strongly correlated with US traf-® c de® cits and argued that Australia, whilst having no facilities-based competition in 1991, had an imbalance proportionately equivalent to the US. ITU (1996) data show that Finland, New Zealand and the Philippines had tra c surpluses in 1995 (despite facilities-based competition), whilst the monopoly countries Cyprus, Qatar, Luxembourg and Switzerland incurred tra c de® cits (ITU, 1996; TeleGeography Inc., 1997) . Second, Cheong and Mullins and the ITU (1994) argued economic development, as measured by income per capita, is also important in stimulating outgoing tra c and so a ects IMTS trade imbalances. This ® nding suggests that policies which promote both economic and telecommunications network development may provide a more e ective and equitable means of stimulating tra c from low income countries to high income countries. 4 These remarks are anticipated by Dr Gautam Kaji (1996, p. 5) , Managing Director of the World Bank:
The World Bank Group think the gains from telecommunications reform are big, and that the reforms are inevitable. But what is not inevitable is the way in which the reforms happen, and this will a ect the distribution of the gains across countries. This of course, goes to the heart of the concerns of those who fear that the outcome of these negotiations will be to enable the rich countries to exploit the poor countries.
This study empirically identi® es the determinants of IMTS trade imbalances. An econometric model is estimated using annual data for 82 countries for the period 1991 through 1995. Model estimates isolate the e ect of collection rates, market structure, and national income on tra c de® cits. Low income country tra c¯ows are analysed separately by estimating the model for a subsample of low and high income country partners. Such analysis suggests reforms to market structure should be complemented by policies of economic development in low income countries. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD ; 1995) and World Bank programmes that enhance income per capita and facilitate telecommunications infrastructure investment will ultimately lead to increased outgoing tra c from low income countries (see Kaji, 1996 ; Wellenius and Stern, 1996) . The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the telecommunications literature on the determinants of tra c de® cits. An econometric model, and the data used for estimation, are described in Section III. Estimation results are reported in Section IV. Section V contains concluding remarks.
I I . I N T E R N A T I ON A L T E L E PH ON E T R A F F I C D E F I C I T S
Empirical and econometric studies of international telephone tra c¯ows are typically based on telephone demand functions, and concerned with quantifying the relationship between tra c and collection rates, and tra c and income. A general indication of the relationships between collection rates and IMTS imbalance, and national income and IMTS imbalance, are found in Figs 1 and 2. Both ® gures suggest that imbalances are inversely related to di erences in collection rates, and positively related to di erences in national income. Ergas and Patterson (1991) observed a large and growing imbalance between US outgoing and incoming telephone tra c. They found, for the period 1985 to 1988, that collection rates for the US were generally lower than those of their foreign counterparts. Ergas and Patterson argued that increased competition among US carriers led to collection rate reductions which stimulated US outgoing tra c. Favourable tra c imbalances and sticky collection rates are especially noticeable in developing countries. The FCC (1992) examined 90 US bilateral markets in 1991 and found average US outgoing collection rates …cr O † were approximately half the incoming collection rate …cr I †. The Commission also suggested that the disparity in collection rates was due to greater price competition arising from US liberalization. Conversely, Cheong and Mullins (1991) argued that US tra c de® cits were caused by di erences in country incomes. They estimated an econometric model with tra c imbalances expressed as a function of relative income (difference between US and foreign incomes) and relative prices (di erence between US and foreign collection rates). These results show US tra c de® cits are positively related to relative income and not related to relative prices. Cheong and Mullins argued that international tra c is insensitive to collection rates since most of this tra c is business related. 6 Given the model's low explanatory 
T rade imbalance in telephone services

. IMT S and income
Note: IMTS imbalance is the log of minutes of outgoing tra c less the log of minutes of incoming tra c. Income di erential is the log of GDP per capita for the outgoing country less the log of GDP per capita for the incoming country. Sample consists of 82 bilateral markets for the period 1991 through 1995 (see Appendix for description of bilateral markets).
power, Cheong and Mullins concluded that the growing US de® cit may be due to socioeconomic and cultural differences not captured in the model. Acton and Vogelsang (1992) employed point-to-point demand models to examine call reversion between the US and 17 Western European countries for the period 1979 through 1986. Point-to-point models allow calls in one direction to a ect return calls through reversion and reciprocity (Larson et al., 1990) Sandback (1996) accounted for reversion and transaction costs by estimating a point-to-point model for outgoing tra c which included the price arguments, outgoing collection rates, relative collection rates, and a collection rate di erential which took e ect when the difference between foreign and domestic country collection rates exceeds a transaction cost threshold. Using data from 154 OECD bilateral telephone markets, Sandback found relative collection rates and the collection rate di erential terms have the impacts expected on outgoing tra c but this a ect is not signi® cant. Sandback suggested that there is some evidence to support the callback e ect where arbitrage opportunities exceed a threshold of US$0.90 a minute.
A separate body of game-theoretic work considers the strategic interaction between carriers in setting collection and accounting rates, and in turn, examine the impact of these rates on telephone demand imbalances. Lu (1993, 1994) developed a model of bilateral monopoly service provision. By modelling the strategic interaction between carriers they examined how price setting and technological disparities a ect demand imbalances. Following Larson et al. (1990) and Acton and Vogelsang (1992) , they accounted for reversion and reciprocity. They found, when allowing for a negotiable settlement rate share, technological improvement by a domestic monopolist led to reduced collection rates, increased demand for outgoing calls, and a growing tra c imbalance.
8 A tra c de® cit entices the home country to revise the settlement rate down in order to minimize the settlement out-payment. This result is consistent with the behaviour of high income countries whom, with stronger international call demand and more advanced technology, seek lower settlement rates. Yun et al. (1997) extended this analysis and allowed competition at either end of the bilateral market. They found increased domestic competition lowered the outgoing collection rate, and exacerbated tra c imbalance. Increased competition in the foreign country mitigates bilateral tra c imbalance. This result supports the ® ndings of Ergas and Patterson (1991) and the FCC (1992). However, Yun et al. (1997) noted as the number of competitors approaches in® nity, a high accounting rate reduced tra c imbalances. This suggests that asymmetric market structure (and the accounting rate system) are not the sole cause of tra c imbalances in countries with liberalized telecommunications sectors. Imbalances may result from longer term cultural and socioeconomic factors. This is re¯ected in studies of internationa l telephone demand. Lago (1970) , Yatrakis (1972) , Rea and Lage (1978) , Acton and Vogelsang (1992) , showed that national income is a determinant of demand, whilst Rohlfs (1974) suggested point-to-point models should include variables that approximate the community of interest between the calling parties (countries) considered. The larger is the community of interest, the greater is telephone tra c. Following Cheong and Mullins (1991) and Sandback (1996) we assume that it is relativities between independent variables which a ect T B . The econometric model for IMTS trade imbalance on bilateral market i at time t, in log-linear form, is:
I I I . E C ON OM E TR I C MOD E L A N D D A T
for iˆ1;. . . ;n, and tˆ1;. . . ;T , where ¬ 0 is an intercept, ¬ 1 through ¬ 4 are elasticities, and " it is a white noise disturbance term.
With pooled time-series, cross-sectional data some of the variation in T B may be caused by di erences in factor prices, service quality and technology between the countries forming the bilateral market. The inclusion of dummy variables for each individual bilateral market allows for di erent intercepts across the sample. Finally, the model is augmented to account for reversion a ects as described by Acton and Vogelsang (1992) and Sandback (1996) :
where 0i is the intercept for the ith bilateral market, P ¤ is a measure of call reversion which comes into a ect when the di erence between incoming and outgoing collection rates exceeds a transactions cost threshold, 1 through 5 are elasticities, and u it is a white noise disturbance term. Theory suggests 2 < 0, 3 > 0 and 5 > 0, whilst the signs for 4 and 6 remain an empirical question. The ability of carriers to set collection rates above cost depends on market power. Market power is in turn related to market structure, measured here by the number of facilities-based carriers and market concentration. Competition is relatively stronger in country D when the number of country D carriers exceeds the number of F carriers, or alternatively, when D market concentration is less than F market concentration. Since relatively lower collection rates in country D should stimulate outgoing tra c, a positive relationship is expected between …MS O =MS I † 1 and T B when the number of carriers is used to measure competition, and a negative relationship is expected when market concentration is used as the competition proxy. Generally, privately owned carriers have an incentive to operate more e ciently than public carriers (Hensher, 1986 ). An increase in the private ownership share of the dominant country D carrier relative to F may result in lower outgoing collection rates and an increase in outgoing tra c relative to incoming tra c. A positive relationship is expected between …MS O =MS I † 2 and T B . Finally, community of interest …Z O =Z I † is measured by the ratio of country D and F trade shares.
9 There is no a priori assumptions about the sign for 6 .
Equation 3 is estimated on annual data for 82 international bilateral telephone markets for the period 1991 through 1995 (see Appendix for a description of bilateral markets). Bilateral telephone markets are formed from 43 countries with average GDP per capita for the period 1991 through 1995 ranging from US$394 (India) to US$26914 (Switzerland). By de® ning low income countries as economies with average GDP per capita of US$2895 or less, and high incomes countries as economies with GDP per capita of US$2896 or more, it is possible to construct two mutually exclusive subsamples. 10 Of the 82 bilateral markets contained in the sample, 66 involve tra c¯ows between high income country pairs and 16 involve tra c between low and high income countries. A description of the variables used for econometric estimation is provided in Table 1 .
. E C ON OM E T R I C R E S U L TS
Equation 3 is estimated by generalized least squares to correct for within group autocorrelation and groupwise heteroscedasticity.
11 Estimates are reported in Table 2 for the full sample of 82 bilateral markets. Table 3 includes estimates for the subsample of 66 markets containing high income country pairs, and estimates for the subsample of 16 markets comprising of high and low income country pairs. Alternative facilities-based competition proxies are used in all models: (i) denotes number of carriers; and (ii) market concentration.
Full sample estimates accord with a priori expectations. The estimated coe cient for the collection rate di erential T rade imbalance in telephone services 1315 9 Other community of interest measures include immigrant population, common language, market size, tourism and trade (Taylor, 1994; Sandback, 1996) . Because these variables are measured in absolute terms it is di cult to isolate their individual impacts in the bidirectional tra c model (3). 10 Our de® nition is based on standard ITU and World Bank classi® cations. The ITU (1997c ) classify economies into the following groups: low income, economies with GDP per capita of US$725 or less; lower-middle income, economies with GDP per capita of more than US$726 and less than US$2895: upper-middle income, economies with GDP per capita of more than US$2896 and less than US$8995: and high income, economies with GDP per capita of US$8956 or more. 11 Diagnostic testing of ordinary least squares residuals suggests the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. A Hausman test indicates the use of individual intercept terms to capture di erences at the bilateral market level is consistent with these data. Estimates of individual intercept terms for all models are available on request from the authors.
is consistent with the hypothesis that a reduction (increase) in country D outgoing (incoming) collection rates stimulates outgoing (incoming) calls which are in turn substituted for incoming (outgoing) calls. Similarly, the signi® cant positive sign for call reversion suggests a collection rate di erential above a transaction cost threshold of US$0.20 is su cient to promote further substitution between outgoing and incoming calls. 12 Both coe cients Note: a When carrier speci® c tra c data are unavailable for particular markets, the dominant carrier's share of world outgoing tra c is used as a proxy for bilateral market share. for the asymmetric market structure variables are signi® -cant and have the expected signs. The reported positive coe cient for facilities-based carriers …MS O =MS I † 1 indicates that the entry of new carriers in a de® cit (surplus) nation will increase (decrease) their tra c de® cit (surplus). That is, as the number of country D carriers providing outgoing call services increases relative to F, collection rate di erentials are reduced, and outgoing tra c increases relative to incoming tra c. Similarly, the positive coecient on private ownership share …MS O =MS I † 2 indicates that domestic carrier conduct responds to the type of ownership. For instance, an increase in private ownership of the dominant carrier in a de® cit nation may lead to eciency gains which are passed on to consumers through lower collection rates, which in turn, leads to increased outgoing tra c. Model estimates also show that outgoing (relative to incoming) tra c is higher the greater is the outgoing country's GDP per capita relative to its bilateral market country partner. The result from model (ii), using market concentration as the competition proxy, are qualitatively similar to those of (a). The coe cient estimate for collection rate di erentials are negative, however, the reversion variable has no impact. The expected coe cient sign on market concentration is negative and suggests that increased competition in D relative to F (as re¯ected in declining market share for the dominant carrier) enhances collection rate di erentials and increases outgoing tra c relative to incoming tra c. Estimated coe cients for both the collection rate and income di erentials are insigni® cant for the subsample of high income country pairs. However, price a ects remain in¯uential through both call reversion and the asymmetric market structure variables. Coe cients for facilities-based carriers, market concentration, and private ownership share are correctly signed and statistically signi® cant.
Collection rate di erentials and call reversion are not signi® cant in the subsample of low and high income country pairs. In (i) market structure a ects on IMTS imbalance are not evident through facilities-based competition but remain strong in private ownership share. In (ii), market structure a ects IMTS imbalance through market concentration and private ownership. The coe cients on private ownership share are signi® cant and relatively stable across all models. This is not surprising since private ownership may be proxying for potential competition, given that telecommunications reforms usually include privatisation as a precursor to the introduction of competition. Any increase in the level of private ownership at either end of the market may provide a signal to domestic and foreign carriers that increased competition for market share may be forthcoming. Finally, the estimated coe cient for income is large and signi® cant in (i) and (ii) and suggests that income di erences are the dominant source of tra c imbalance in markets comprising of low and high income country partners. Consider a low income country which has a tra c surplus with a high income country. A per cent increase in this country's GDP per capita would stimulate outgoing tra c and result in a 0.824 (0.712) per cent reduction in the high income country's tra c de® cit. High income countries are likely to have a more extensive level of network development and a greater propensity for new investment which leads to cost e ciencies. Thus, lower collection rates would be generally expected in high income countries.
. C ON C L U S I ON S
The accounting rate system and concentrated telecommunications markets have contributed to the distortion in IMTS settlement payments. Pressure is building within the telecommunications community to revise the current system of settlement payments, and to promote greater competition between carriers (FCC, 1997b (FCC, , 1996 ITU, 1997b; WTO, 1997) . This pressure has come mainly from carriers and government agencies in those countries which make substantial settlement payments to countries that are net-exporters of IMTS. This study develops an econometric model to empirically identify determinants of IMTS imbalance. Model results show that collection rate di erentials and asymmetric market structure are important determinants of imbalance in bilateral markets comprising of high income country partners. Therefore, FCC (1996 and WTO (1997) initiatives to achieve e cient pricing through reforms to market structure should be most e ective in stimulating tra c from high income countries, traditionally served by publicly owned monopolies. GDP per capita appears to be the dominant source of tra c imbalance in markets comprising of low and high income country partners. Economic development policies that enhance income per capita and telecommunications network investment may be more appropriate mechanisms for stimulating outgoing tra c from developing countries. Here, market orientated liberalization policies should be accompanied by development programmes such as those advocated by the EBRD (1995) and World Bank.
Finally, tra c imbalance between country partners only concerns economists because of ine cient pricing. When collection rates and settlement rates re¯ect the cost of service provision, the issue of imbalance issue becomes less relevant. In this ® rst-best world, economic rents would be dissipated and relative prices would provide correct signals to IMTS users. In a second-best world, the choice of mechanisms for achieving an e cient and equitable outcome for developing countries is clearly important. One such mechanism would require a careful blend of increased market liberalization in high income countries, along with targeted assistance programmes in developing countries. In the words of Gautam Kaji (1996, p. 5 
):
We (the World Bank Group) see considerable scope for the protection of developing country interests in the competition among the developed countries to supply their markets. As a critical mass of developed countries liberalizes their own markets, developing countries will bene® t from competition among telecommunications suppliers and the threat of unfair use of market power will be minimized.
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